{"id":579,"date":"2020-10-15T12:21:07","date_gmt":"2020-10-15T12:21:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/?p=579"},"modified":"2020-10-15T12:21:07","modified_gmt":"2020-10-15T12:21:07","slug":"india-japan-indo-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/2020\/10\/15\/india-japan-indo-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"INDIA, JAPAN & INDO-PACIFIC"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Prof. V.P. Gupta<\/strong>,Director, Rau\u2019s IAS Study Circle, New Delhi \u2013 Jaipur \u2013 Bengaluru<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India-Japan\nrelation has attained a progressive momentum since the articulation of \u2018Confluence\nof Seas\u2019 vision<\/strong> by Mr. Shinzo Abe in 2007. India-Japan relations are\nnow marked by a common principle of upholding rule of law and democratic\nvalues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022   Expansion of partnership with US and other\npartners in forming and maintaining a new security architecture<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022   Ensuring freedom of navigation by upholding\ninternational law such as UNCLOS<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022   Safeguarding a safe and open Indo-Pacific\nregion<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\nand Japan are currently engaging in ensuring a new security architecture in Indo-Pacific\nregion <\/strong>with the common engagement in Quadrilateral grouping with\nAustralia and US and engaging ASEAN member countries<\/strong> in South China Sea to\ncontain China. The causal determinant of this progress in the bilateral\nrelationship is the convergence of mutual interests. These interests range from\nthe containment of China as a great power in Asia, economic engagement, and a nudge\nfrom US pivot to Asia. Moreover, the bilateral relation entered a phase of a\ndramatic leap forward with deepening of engagement with Mr. Shinzo Abe in\nthe field of international politics and economic cooperation. The current\nscenario of India-Japan relations can be assessed by understanding\ninstitutional engagement between both nations in both multilateral and\nbilateral formats, economic relations, defence and nuclear engagement, and the\nimpact of China and the United States in India-Japan strategic relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

INSTITUTIONAL\nENGAGEMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\nand Japan have formed a multitude of institutional and bilateral engagement\nmechanisms that range in scope from UNSC reforms, defence and security\nengagements, bilateral meetings, among other engagements.  India and Japan along with Germany and\nBrazil are members of an informal group \u2018G4\u2019 <\/strong>and declared their intent to\nsupport each other\u2019s candidacy for a permanent seat in UNSC. Similarly, both\nnations along with US and Australia have formed an informal \u2018Quadrilateral\nGroup\u2019 with a political and security perspective within Indo-Pacific\nregion.  Both nations also engage with\nthe US in trilateral Malabar naval exercises, apart from a bilateral \u2018Sahyog-Kaijin\u2019<\/strong>\ncoast guard exercises. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\nand Japan have a continued process of 2+2 dialogue<\/strong>, involving Foreign\nand Defence Secretaries, for growing a strategic partnership based on security\nperspective. In addition, both countries would institutionalise the\n\u2018India-Japan Maritime Affairs Dialogue\u2019 further, which focuses on\nnon-traditional maritime threats and cooperation in maritime affairs. Japan\nwould also align its \u2018Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy\u2019 with India\u2019s \u2018Act\nEast\u2019 Policy by enhancing maritime security cooperation and cooperate on\nimproving connectivity within Indo-Pacific region, and which has culminated\ninto the larger Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). <\/strong>India and Japan\nconceived the AAGC with the objective of cultivating value chains by advancing\neconomic networks by connecting growth centres from Asia to Africa. AAGC would\nfocus on four priority areas of development projects, quality infrastructure\nand institutional connectivity, skill development and capacity building and\npeople-to-people cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japan\u2019s\nPrime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe visited India for the 12th India-Japan\nAnnual Summit in September, 2017 and 15 MoUs were signed that ranged from\ndisaster risk management, skills development, science and technology and in the\nsports field. The summit reflected the multifaceted cooperation under the\nframework of \u2018Special Strategic and Global Partnership\u2019<\/strong> of the \u2018India\nand Japan Vision 2025<\/strong>\u2019, and advanced the economic engagement towards an\n\u2018action-oriented partnership\u2019 as envisioned by both countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ECONOMIC\nENGAGEMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japan\nand India decided in the recent summit to form the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial\nCorridor, similar to the format of Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor.  Both aim at developing new industrial cities\nas \u2018Smart Cities\u2019 with infrastructure linkages such as power plants, logistics\nfacilities and softer initiatives such as skill development programmes.\nMoreover, several Japan-India Institutes for Manufacturing (JIMs)<\/strong> would\nbe formed in Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu in 2017, under the\n\u2018Manufacturing Skill Transfer Promotion Programme\u2019. This programme is meant to\nenhance the manufacturing base of India and contribute to \u2018Make in India\u2019 and\n\u2018Skill India\u2019 programmes. It will train individuals with Japanese style\nmanufacturing skills and practices through the establishment of JIM in\nengineering colleges designated by Japanese companies in India. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A\nmajor highlight of the recent summit was the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed\nRailway for which Japan would cooperate in terms of financing through soft\nloans, etc. The project is a significant success for Mr. Shinzo Abe\u2019s Expanded\nPartnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI)<\/strong> initiative that seeks to\nfacilitate Japan\u2019s expansion to emerging Asian markets, and for\nMr. Narendra Modi\u2019s \u2018Make in India\u2019 initiative. Similarly, India-Japan Act\nEast Forum will focus on enhancing connectivity and promote developmental\nprojects in the North Eastern Region of India by providing soft loans for\nconnectivity infrastructure. Both countries would also begin a \u2018Japan-India\nspecial programme for Make in India\u2019 that would cooperate in infrastructure\ndevelopment programme in Mandal Bechraj-Khoraj area in Gujarat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defence\ncooperation has seen a shift from the past, wherein Japan is now ready to\nprovide its US-2 amphibian aircraft to India and would collaborate in the area\nof Unmanned Ground Vehicles and Robotics, thus paving the way for improving\ndefence engagement between both nations. Moreover, a shift is also seen in the\nnuclear policy and cooperation between both nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NUCLEAR\nPOLICY AND ENGAGEMENT  <\/strong>Japan\nhad earlier been reluctant to cooperate with India on civil nuclear programme\ndue to India\u2019s refusal to sign the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)\nand Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and further strained by India\u2019s nuclear\ntests of 1998. Mr. Shinzo Abe has moved beyond the \u2018nuclear allergy\u2019 that\nstrained relations in the past and has cooperated with India on atomic energy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

An\n\u2018Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy\u2019<\/strong> was\ninitiated in 2010 between Dr. Manmohan Singh and Mr. Shinzo Abe and\nit was finally agreed upon in 2016 between Mr. Narendra Modi and\nMr. Shinzo Abe. The agreement entered into force in 2017, and made India\nthe first non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to have\nsigned such a deal with Japan. An aspect of the agreement was India\u2019s\ninformally having a \u2018unilateral moratorium\u2019 on further nuclear weapons\ntesting.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nshift in defence engagement and civil nuclear policy, apart from being a\nconsequence of economic policy, is also indirectly caused by the emergence of\nChina and US policy towards India and Japan.  \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

EMERGENCE\nOF CHINA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nstrategic cooperation between India and Japan within the Indo-Pacific region\nhas been a reaction towards the rise of China and its growing unilateralism\nthrough OBOR,<\/strong> expansion in South China Sea, skirmishes on borders, among\nother initiatives in Indo-Pacific region. This fear has driven India and Japan\nto consider banding together and providing a form of collective security\narrangement in the Indo-Pacific region and pursue alternative connectivity\ninitiatives in Asia. Both nations have asserted for multiple power centres in\nAsia, thereby  containing China\u2019s rise as\na continental power in Asia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japan\nand India have also affirmed their commitment for a free, open and prosperous\nIndo-Pacific region where sovereignty and international law are respected and\nthere is freedom of navigation and over flight. This is in reference to China\u2019s\nposition in South China Sea, where it has staked claims to international waters\nas being Chinese territory and under Chinese sovereign control. Similarly, both\nnations underlined the use of responsible debt financing practices in\nconnectivity infrastructure, and ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial\nintegrity, to counter China\u2019s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) programme, wherein\nnations such as Sri Lanka has been placed under considerable Chinese debt due\nto the Hambantota Port, and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)<\/strong>\nas violating Indian territorial sovereignty in Pakistan occupied Kashmir\n(PoK).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nrecent flare-ups of China with Japan and India have also contributed towards\nspecific engagements between India and Japan to counter China. Japan is\ndependent upon China for import of Rare Earth Metals, which China has used as a\nstrategic asset such as curbing its export during the Senkaku Islands\nstand-off, and led to India and Japan signing a trade pact in 2012 which\nallowed India to export REEs to Japan. Similarly, Japan was the only nation to openly\nextend public support to India during the Doklam confrontation with China. Both\nnations have been seen supporting each other as being alternative poles of\npower in Asia and the world.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\nand Japan have ensured that their engagement does not antagonise China, and\nhave maintained strategic autonomy with their bilateral relations with China.\nThis is seen with India being a founding member of the China-led Asian\nInfrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB)<\/strong> which Japan has refused to join. The\nAIIB would be in competition with the Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB).\nApart from the motivation to balance China\u2019s growing assertiveness, there have\nbeen another reasons driving the strategic relationship deeper, which is the US\npivot to Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

INDIA-JAPAN\nAND THE US INFLUENCE<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

International\npolitics in Asia has seen India maintaining a non-aligned position while Japan\nhas been a part of the US bloc. The recent growth in India\u2019s strategic\nengagement with the United States has caused the relations between India and\nJapan to move beyond their ideological traditions. The change in Asian dynamics\nwith the emergence of China and to augment the diminishing capacity of US had\ncaused Mr. Obama to initiate a \u2018Pivot to Asia\u2019 policy, with India and\nJapan being prime pivotal States. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\nand Japan are competing to balance China in South Asia and East Asia\nrespectively but have yet to engage each other to further augment their power\nwithin their regions. The active encouragement of US has led India to pursue\nstrategic interests in South East Asia as seen in the formation of\nQuadrilateral Grouping, while Japan has been an active partner in Malabar\nexercises in South Asia. Both nations are cooperating with US against North\nKorea\u2019s nuclear programme, re-building Afghanistan, among other US-dominated\ninitiatives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\nand Japan, in a bilateral alliance, have neither the mandate to replace US in\nAsia nor potential to contain China. In spite of the expeditious growth in\nstrategic relations, there lacks a strategic military partnership between both\nnations and a vision to shape the Asian security structure together. This\nmissing link is being fulfilled by the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ASSESSING\nRELATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2017\nmarked 10 years since Mr. Shinzo Abe declared the vision of \u2018Confluence of\nSeas\u2019 in India. Relation between India and Japan has seen tremendous growth in\nterms of convergence of views regarding Asian geo-politics and geo-economics,\nfrom countering China, forming connectivity infrastructure, and engaging with\nUS. The economic cooperation is being extensively augmented with the personal\nencouragement of Mr. Narendra Modi and Mr. Shinzo Abe, and is\nshowcased in both major and minor aspects such as High Speed Railway project,\nindustrial corridors, etc. India-Japan relation has witnessed radical change in\nterms of defence engagement and nuclear policy in the past 10 years, and is\nreflecting in other fields such as the recent currency-swap agreement, expected\ndefence logistics agreement etc.  <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Prof. V.P. Gupta,Director, Rau\u2019s IAS Study Circle, New Delhi \u2013 Jaipur \u2013 Bengaluru India-Japan relation has attained a progressive momentum since the articulation of \u2018Confluence of Seas\u2019 vision by Mr. Shinzo Abe in 2007. India-Japan relations are now marked by a common principle of upholding rule of law and democratic values. \u2022   Expansion of partnership with […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/579"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=579"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/579\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":580,"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/579\/revisions\/580"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=579"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=579"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.competitionreview.in\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=579"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}